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By many objective measures, over the last three decades, New York City has experienced a 
dramatic reversal of demographic trends. The City regained the population that it lost in the 
1970s and became a magnet for college graduates, young adults, and childless families.1 
While these demographic trends have undoubtedly added to the vibrancy of the City, the 
dark underbelly of this type of population change lies in increasing economic inequality and 
upward pressures on housing prices. These demographic changes and their implications 
for the housing market have also not been distributed equally across neighborhoods. In 
fact, neighborhoods that were low-income in 1990 and experienced rent growth above the 
median for the City, are precisely the ones that also experienced the fastest growth in the 
number of college graduates, the number of childless households, and the number of white 
residents.2 This process of gentrification of New York City’s low-income neighborhoods has 
sharply increased the rent burden for low and moderate income households. Moreover, 
while gentrifying neighborhoods have added housing units at a pace greater than non-gen-
trifying neighborhoods, the share of newly available units affordable to low-income and 
working-class families has sharply decreased since 2000.3
“gentrifying neighborhoods have added housing units at 
a pace greater than non-gentrifying neighborhoods, the 
share of newly available units affordable to low-income and 
working-class families has sharply decreased since 2000”
As we argued in the previous policy brief released by the CUNY Dominican Studies Institute 
in January 2018, the demographic changes that New York City has experienced since 1990 
put into serious question whether neighborhoods such as Washington Heights/Inwood, 
which have been the home to generations of Dominicans, will continue to be spaces for 
low-income, immigrant, and working-class people.4 While policy-makers unanimously agree 
that the displacement of low-income and working-class people from gentrifying neighbor-
hoods and the scarcity of affordable housing are problems that New York City needs to face, 
the solutions to the City’s housing crisis have been piecemeal, and have to a large extent, 
ignored the regulatory environment, which has allowed rents to skyrocket.
1  NYU Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy. (2016). State of New York City’s Housing 




4  Hernandez, R, Sezgin, U., and Marrara, S. (2018). When a Neighborhood Becomes a Revolving 
Door to Dominicans: Rising Housing Costs in Washington Heights/Inwood and the Declining Presence of 
Dominicans. CUNY Dominican Studies Institute.
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In particular, even though New York City has one of the nation’s most comprehensive rent 
stabilization laws and has recently committed to helping low-income tenants with free le-
gal representation when facing eviction, the tenant protection regulations have significant 
loopholes, which have been abused by landlords to push long-term tenants out in search of 
higher rents from more affluent newcomers. Moreover, recent proposals by the City, such as 
the one to rezone Inwood allowing for new residential and commercial construction5, have 
faced vigorous opposition from community members as rezoning is seen as another tool to 
add unaffordable housing to the neighborhood and to continue the upward pressures on 
rents in previously affordable units. At stake here are not only the city’s development ambi-
tions, which undoubtedly will produce improvements in infrastructure. The current proposed 
plan for the rezoning includes ambitious promises for investment in the Inwood community 
through the preservation and construction of affordable housing, a grant program for existing 
businesses, and upgrades to open space and neighborhood institutions. Also at stake is how 
new city-sponsored investments in a neighborhood undergoing gentrification do not end up 
accelerating the displacement of long-term residents or creating even more perverse incen-
tives for landlords to push long-term tenants out and replace them with affluent newcomers. 
“ the tenant protection regulations have significant 
loopholes, which have been abused by landlords to push 
long-term tenants out in search of higher rents from 
more affluent newcomers”
Our policy recommendations below represent a multi-pronged approach to combating 
housing unaffordability in Washington Heights/Inwood. The recommendations combine 
generating new revenue for housing with statutory reform of rent regulations at the state lev-
el. We think these policies are the most promising ones in addressing the housing needs of 
the Washington Heights/Inwood community. Some of them, if enacted, will also have broad 
beneficial impacts for all working class New Yorkers. In particular, we propose that the City of 
New York establish a tax-increment financing (TIF) area in Washington Heights/Inwood and 
use the revenues from it to fund a Community Land Trust (CLT) whose leadership comes from 
local community members. The idea behind the TIF area is to harness the appreciation in 
housing prices that is driven by neighborhood demographic change and by potential future 
city investment through the Inwood rezoning plan. We call on the City of New York to rein-
vest a portion of the taxes generated by gentrification for the benefit of the local community. 
We also call on the State of New York to close loopholes in laws governing rent stabilized 
apartments and establish protections for tenants with preferential rent riders in their lease 
agreements. Our first proposal could serve as a model to other neighborhoods in New York 




City and beyond in harnessing the changes induced by gentrification to the benefit of long-
term neighborhood residents. Our second proposal has wide support amongst the city’s 
housing policy advocates since it would reform a rent system, which despite being created 
to protect tenants, has been used to benefit landlords and property owners.
“we propose that the City of New York establish a 
tax-increment financing (TIF) area in Washington 
Heights/Inwood and use the revenues from it to fund a 
Community Land Trust (CLT) whose leadership comes 
from local community members”
1. ESTABLISH A TAX-INCREMENT FINANCING (TIF) AREA 
    TO FUND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
We start our policy recommendations with the most ambitious one amongst them. We 
propose that the City of New York establish a tax-increment financing area in Washington 
Heights/Inwood, the revenues from which can be used to fund affordable housing.
Here is how tax-increment financing works. In any neighborhood, the process of gentrifica-
tion causes previously cheaper but still economically viable housing units to appreciate in 
value. The local municipality can then collect additional property tax on the housing appreci-
ation fueled by gentrification. These additional revenues can be set aside for two neighbor-
hood-specific purposes: first, they can fund affordable housing through either preservation, 
new construction, or both; and second, they can be applied to local amenity improvements, 
such as better parks and more reliable services.
The tax-increment financing (TIF) strategy has typically been used as an economic develop-
ment tool whereby a local government designates an area as a TIF area and assesses the 
value of existing property for the purposes of taxation. As new investments (both private and 
public) make the area more attractive, property values rise producing increased tax revenue 
for the local government in general and the TIF area specifically. 
The main advantage of tax-increment financing is that it keeps the revenues generated by 
gentrification in the same neighborhood. Since the revenues generated by TIF can be used 
for the preservation of affordable units, low-income residents who already live in the neigh-
borhood directly benefit from the process of gentrification. In section 2 below, we propose 
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that the City spend the revenues generated by the TIF area to fund a Community Land Trust 
(CLT) as a means of preserving long-term affordability for community residents.6
  
Another important advantage of tax-increment financing is that it is self-financing. Local mu-
nicipalities do not need to raise any new taxes. Rather, investments in infrastructure and the 
concomitant increases in the price of housing are used to help gentrifying neighborhoods 
maintain their socioeconomic diversity.
Currently, local housing policies tend to deal with gentrification in inefficient ways. Local 
jurisdictions, for instance, require new construction to incorporate a certain portion of afford-
able units. Yet, new construction in gentrifying neighborhoods can be tied up for years in 
protests and litigation. A clear example of this is the current Inwood rezoning proposal which 
has already generated much opposition amongst neighborhood residents, the local commu-
nity board, and the Manhattan Borough President. The contention is that it is not clear how 
new construction will affect the price of existing housing in the area. 
The TIF strategy has several advantages over standard approaches to affordable housing.7 
From the perspective of developers and property owners, the TIF area does not single 
out particular properties. Everyone who experiences a financial gain in property values 
from gentrification contributes tax on these additional profits. Since the TIF area collects 
taxes on additional profits, there is less of a possibility that these revenues will be seen as 
a new tax. From the perspective of incumbent residents, gentrification is directly financing 
protections against rent inflation, and this level of financing is directly proportional to the 
volume of gentrification. As property values rise due to gentrification, the tax that the City 
collects on the appreciation is earmarked specifically to preserve the affordability of exist-
ing units or to build new affordable units. The greater the levels of property appreciation, 
and thus the greater revenue generated in the TIF area, the more money gets invested 
back into the neighborhood.
There are important details to consider before and during the designation of TIF areas, the 
implementation of the financing, and the disbursement of funds.8 Issues such as how long 
the financing will last, how the new funds will be allocated, and who will get priority for as-
sistance will undoubtedly generate lively debate. However, as Lance Freeman has argued, 
tax-increment financing makes a lot of sense from an equity perspective in that property 
6  An activist at a recent community board meeting on the Inwood rezoning plan did in fact men-
tion establishing a community land trust to preserve affordability in the neighborhood. Savitch-Lew, A. 
(April 11, 2018). Vibrant Opposition at BP’s Inwood Rezoning Hearing. City Limits. Retrieved from https://
citylimits.org/2018/04/11/vibrant-opposition-at-bps-inwood-rezoning-hearing/
7 The case for tax-increment financing is based on Freeman, L. (2006). There Goes the ‘Hood, 
Chapter 6. Philadelphia, PA: Tempe University Press.
8  Erickson, K. (2011). Protecting Low-income Residents during Tax Increment Financing Redevel-
opment. Wash. UJL & Pol’y, 36, 203.
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owners who directly benefit from gentrification are also the ones who help the most vul-
nerable residents in gentrifying neighborhoods when TIF’s exist. Moreover, the successful 
implementation of TIF areas across the United States has demonstrated that issues around 
the implementation of such programs are not insurmountable stumbling blocks.9
Still, we would like to acknowledge some potential pitfalls of our TIF proposal. First, as we 
mention above, TIF-area financing has been usually used for large public infrastructure devel-
opments. For example, using the TIF model, New York City recently funded the expansion of 
the 7 subway line to the 34th Street-Hudson Yards Station without any state or federal assis-
tance.10 This was the first time the City had used TIF for major infrastructure improvements, 
but since then advocates of this financing model have proposed other similar projects. TIF is 
usually seen as a way to re-capture land value increases due to public investments in some 
type of infrastructure, such as subways, office buildings, commercial retail development, or 
even cosmetic improvements to an area. Housing in general, and affordable housing in par-
ticular, is usually not seen as “infrastructure” by local policy makers. We argue that housing 
represents infrastructure because there are no neighborhoods without housing.  We further 
argue that for working class families housing is the most valuable type of infrastructure be-
cause it provides security and stability for the members of said families. Therefore, using TIF 
to fund affordable housing is a way for any city to invest in infrastructure that is critical to thriv-
ing working-class communities.
“Housing in general, and affordable housing in particular, 
is usually not seen as “infrastructure” by local policy 
makers. We argue that housing represents infrastructure 
because there are no neighborhoods without housing.  We 
further argue that for working class families housing is the 
most valuable type of infrastructure because it provides 
security and stability for the members of said families”
Second, we would like to acknowledge that property taxes especially in gentrifying New York 
neighborhoods are already an issue for long-term homeowners. The City assesses property 
taxes annually based on comparative sales, but there are state-mandated caps on assessed 
property value increases for one to three family homes. This means that the most expensive 
housing in already gentrified neighborhoods might be assessed lower tax bills than the rapidly 
appreciating but still moderately priced housing in newly gentrifying neighborhoods. A new law 
suit against the City has produced numbers showing that homeowners in Washington Heights 
9  Freeman, L. (2006). There Goes the ‘Hood, Chapter 6. Philadelphia, PA: Tempe University Press.
10  Campion, S. (Dec. 2017). Tax Increment Financing: A Primer. Citizens Budget Commission New 
York. Retrieved from https://cbcny.org/sites/default/files/media/files/REPORT_TIFs_12062017_0.pdf
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are assessed a home value of 141% of comparative sales prices. The respective number for 
Williamsburg is 74%.11 While the TIF area will not collect any new taxes, but rather capture the 
increase in property taxes due to rising property values, the issue of property taxes and afford-
ability for long-term homeowners is important. We know from recent nationally representative 
estimates that there is no evidence that increasing property taxes displaces homeowners or 
that property tax limits protect homeowners in gentrifying neighborhoods.12 Nevertheless, pre-
serving affordability for long-term homeowners in gentrifying neighborhoods is a vital part of 
stemming the process of displacement. Therefore, in our recommendations below we propose 
that the Community Land Trust (CLT) preserve affordability for both renters and homeowners. 
2. USE THE FUNDS FROM THE TAX-INCREMENT FINANCING (TIF) AREA 
    TO FUND A COMMUNITY LAND TRUST (CLT)
We propose that the additional revenue generated by the TIF area be used to fund a Com-
munity Land Trust (CLT) in the Washington Heights/Inwood area.
The idea of Community Land Trusts (CLT) at the most basic level involves dedicating a reve-
nue stream for the purchase of land for the benefit of the local community.13 The land is held 
in a trust in perpetuity by a local non-profit organization, which makes sure to represent the 
interests of the beneficiaries of the trust. Housing on the CLT land is usually purchased along 
with it but later can be sold off to homeowners, cooperatives, other non-profits, or for-profit 
businesses. All individuals and businesses that purchase housing on CLT-owned land agree 
to either keep rental units affordable to community residents or to forgo profits above a 
certain level should they decide to sell the property. The CLT has the right to re-purchase 
any buildings on its land up for sale for below-market price and to intervene in situations of 
absentee or neglectful landlords. The CLT leadership comes from residents of buildings on 
CLT land, community members who do not live on CLT land but are part of the CLT service 
area, and people who represent the public interest.
The CLT model was first developed by black farmers who sought to protect their assets in 
the Jim Crow South.14 More recently, the CLT model has been a major tool in environmental 
preservation efforts and in initiatives aimed at ensuring long-term affordability for homeown-
11  Smith, G. (April 23, 2017). NYC Property Taxes Favor Rich and White Homeowners, Lawsuit 
Claims. NY Daily News. Retreived from http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-property-taxes-favor-
rich-white-homeowners-suit-claims-article-1.3089889
12  Martin, I. W., & Beck, K. (2018). Gentrification, Property Tax Limitation, and Displacement. Urban 
Affairs Review, 54(1), 33-73.
13 The description of CLTs is based on White, K. (1982). The Community Land Trust Handbook. by 
The Institute for Community Economics.
14  Davis, J.E. (Writer) & Cohen, H. (Editor). (2016). Arc of Justice: The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of a Be-
loved Community [Documentary]. Open Studio Productions. Retrieved from https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/574610bb20c647ad3c3c2daf/t/583c8c659de4bb595172a9b2/1480363113503/AoJ_backstory_v4a.pdf
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er housing.15 CLTs have also gained popularity amongst housing advocates in gentrifying 
neighborhoods because their basic structure can be easily harnessed to help both renters 
and homeowners in neighborhoods with affordability issues.
In neighborhoods such as Washington Heights/Inwood, CLTs are an attractive way to subsi-
dize affordable housing because the affordability stays with the housing unit and the local 
community in perpetuity and not with the household or the developer who might tempo-
rarily take advantage of a specific subsidy for affordable housing. When CLTs purchase land 
in gentrifying communities, they disrupt potential attempts to speculate with the price of 
that land. They also limit the amount of housing units available to potential high-income 
newcomers to the neighborhood. By restricting the amount of land and housing that could 
be gentrified, CLTs preserve the socioeconomic diversity of neighborhoods. In fact, a recent 
research article published in the Journal of Urban Affairs (JUA) has shown, urban CLTs in 
gentrifying neighborhoods have been successful in stabilizing neighborhoods at risk of un-
dergoing gentrification.16
Moreover, since CLTs are governed by a board of local community stakeholders, they are an 
ideal vehicle not only for the preservation of housing affordability but also for the steward-
ship of local community priorities. Since CLTs involve collective ownership of housing and 
land on behalf of a community, CLT advocates have also argued that this particular type of 
community ownership encourages social stability and neighborhood cohesion.17
We think that the time is particularly auspicious for starting a CLT in Washington Heights/
Inwood. New York City’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development recently 
launched a $1.6 million seed fund for CLTs in New York City.18 In December 2017, the New 
York City Council officially codified CLTs into city law, allowing CLTs to enter into regulatory 
agreements with the city.19 
There is no CLT in Washington Heights/Inwood yet, but an organization called Faith in New 
York is currently looking to start one with a property owned by the Department of Transpor-
15  Temkin, K., Theodos, B., and Price, D. (2010). Shared Equity Homeownership Evaluation: Case Study 
of the San Francisco Citywide Inclusionary Affordable Housing Program. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
16  Myungshik, C. Van Zandt, S.and Matarrita-Cascante, D. (2018). Can Community Land Trusts 
Slow Gentrification? Journal of Urban Affairs 40(3), 394-411.
17  Savitch-Lew, A. (January 8, 2018). The NYC Community Land Trust Movement Wants to Go Big. 
City Limits. Retrieved from https://citylimits.org/2018/01/08/the-nyc-community-land-trust-movement-
wants-to-go-big/
18  New York City Housing and Preservation Department. (July 19, 2017). Enterprise Awards New 
York City $1.65 Million to Support the Formation and Expansion of Community Land Trusts. Retrieved 
from https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/about/press-releases/2017/07/07-19b-17.page
19 Savitch-Lew, A. (January 8, 2018). The NYC Community Land Trust Movement Wants to Go Big. 
City Limits. Retrieved from https://citylimits.org/2018/01/08/the-nyc-community-land-trust-movement-
wants-to-go-big/
8   
tation, located at 672 W 158th Street.20 Currently, the only fully fledged CLT in New York City 
is Cooper Square on the Lower East Side. This CLT owns the land where 328 low-income co-
op units are located. There are, however, many organizations around New York City actively 
looking to replicate Cooper Square’s success. An example of one of them is East Harlem- El 
Barrio Community Land Trust, which recently convinced the City to transfer ownership of four 
 
buildings to the CLT.21 CLT proponents have also identified many city-owned vacant lots that 
could serve as a jumping-off point for the establishment of CLTs across New York City.22
Relying exclusively on new housing construction or gut rehabilitation in New York City is ex-
tremely expensive. Currently, the average per-unit New York City subsidy for new affordable 
housing is $45,000; a $17,000 increase since 2014, because of increased land and construc-
tion costs.23 Moreover, the mayor’s plan to build and preserve affordable housing in Wash-
ington Heights/Inwood has so far led to the construction of only three new properties and 
the preservation of six additional ones for a total of 91 new units and 223 preserved units.24 
Therefore, what we propose here is to go beyond the idea of constructing new housing by 
purchasing available land and/or already existing housing stock, and ensuring long-term 
affordability through a CLT funded by tax-increment financing (TIF).  The CLT harnesses the 
process of gentrification and revitalizes a neighborhood while putting a damper on land 
speculation and increasing rents.
3. CLOSE LOOPHOLES IN RENT REGULATIONS
A.Vacancy decontrol
Vacancy decontrol, colloquially also known as the “eviction bonus,” is a loophole in New 
York City rent stabilization laws which allows an owner to increase rents by 20% plus 1/60th 
of the cost of any improvements done to a rent-stabilized unit when a renter moves out. 
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 There are more than 1,000 empty city-owned lots across New York City. Many of them are not 
suitable for housing construction, but local housing groups have been active in trying to acquire some of 
the empty lots for the benefit of the local communities. Murphy, J. (2016, April 18). City’s Empty Spaces: 
What is the Housing Potential? City Limits Retrieved from https://citylimits.org/2016/04/18/citys-empty-
spaces-what-is-the-housing-potential/
23 Goodman, D. (March 4, 2018). De Blasio Bolsters Affordable Housing, but at What Price? The 
New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/nyregion/de-blasio-afford-
able-housing-cost.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=88EF5BF626FCCCE4126B6D2A9FEBD9B0&gwt=pay
24 None of the new units are affordable for extremely low-income households (0% to 30% of medi-
an income) or very low-income households (30% to 50% of median income). About 70% of the preserved 
units are available to either extremely low-income households or very low-income household. Authors’ 
calculations from New York City Housing and Preservation Department. Housing New York Map [Interac-
tive Map]. Retrieved from http://hpd.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=192d198f84e-
04b8896e6b9cad8760f22 
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Once an apartment reaches $2,733.75 through vacancy increases, it is permanently removed 
from the rent-stabilized stock. Between 1994 and 2016, 284,301 units were lost from the 
rent stabilized housing stock. More than half of them (54% or 152,147 units) were lost due to 
high-rent vacancy deregulation. Even though over the same period the city added 132,402 
units to the stabilized housing stock, the net loss of stabilized units stands at 151,899.25 
A newly available building-level dataset scraped from tax bills retrieved from the website 
of the NYC Department of Finance allows us to examine the loss of rent stabilized units in 
Washington Heights/Inwood as compared to the rest of the city. Washington Heights/In-
wood has experienced a net loss of 4,844 rent stabilized units between 2007 and 2014. This 
loss represents 6.0% of total units in stabilized buildings in Washington Heights/Inwood and 
8.9% of the total citywide net loss of stabilized units. In comparison, the overall stabilized 
unit loss as percent of total units in stabilized buildings at the city level stands at 3.8%.26 This 
reflects a clear systematic destruction of the housing infrastructure that has enabled Domin-
icans and other working-class families to live in Washington Heights/Inwood for decades. 
“Washington Heights/Inwood has experienced a net loss 
of 4,844 rent stabilized units between 2007 and 2014”
 
According to 2014 data from the New York City Housing Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS), rent 
stabilized apartments constitute 85% of the rental housing stock in Washington Heights/
Inwood (see Table 1). Eighty-seven percent of renter Dominican households in Washington 
Heights/Inwood live in a rent stabilized apartment. This represents a five percentage point 
drop since 2002. 
“Eighty-seven percent of renter Dominican households 
in Washington Heights/Inwood live in a rent stabilized 
apartment. This represents a five percentage point drop 
since 2002”
 
The trends and patterns for Dominicans are even starker when we examine the Dominican 
population in New York City overall. As reflected in Table 1, in 2014 in New York City, 64% 
25 New York City Rent Guidelines Board. (June 1, 2017). Memorandum: Additional Preferential Rent 
Data from NYS Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR). Retrieved from https://assets.docu-
mentcloud.org/documents/3872406/DHCR-Data-Memo-June-2017.pdf
26 Net citywide loss of rent stabilized apartments between 2007 and 2014 is 54,239 units out of 
1,417,773 units in buildings with at least one stabilized unit over the period. Net Washington Heights/
Inwood loss of rent stabilized units between 2007 and 2014 is 4,844 units out of 81,231 units in buildings 
with at least one stabilized unit over the period. For more information on the project that created this 
dataset, see: https://github.com/talos/nyc-stabilization-unit-counts
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of renter Dominican households lived in a rent stabilized unit. This represents a six percent-
age point drop since 2002. Just as in Washington Heights/Inwood, in New York City overall, 
Dominican renters live in rent stabilized units at much greater rates as compared to other 
Latinos, Non-Hispanic Whites, Non-Hispanic Blacks, and Non-Hispanic Asians. The high con-
centration of Dominican households in rent stabilized units means that any further erosion in 
rent stabilization will hit the Dominican community particularly hard.
“The high concentration of Dominican households in rent 
stabilized units means that any further erosion in rent stabi-
lization will hit the Dominican community particularly hard”
 
Table 1.
Race/Ethnicity of Householders in New York City and in Washington Heights/Inwood
by Rent stabilized units as % of all renter occupied units-2002-2014












2002 70% 51% 52% 43% 45% 50%
2005 65% 51% 51% 45% 47% 50%
2008 67% 48% 46% 44% 43% 47%
2011 63% 46% 45% 43% 42% 46%
2014 64% 48% 48% 45% 42% 48%
Washington Heights/Inwood









2002 92% 79% 83% 66% 85%
2005 89% 87% 84% 72% 85%
2008 91% 82% 73% 73% 83%
2011 88% 83% 76% 67% 83%
2014 87% 79% 86% 75%  85%
Source: Authors’ calculations from the New York City Housing Vacancy Survey (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014).  
The data is calculated at 3- year intervals. 
a There are fewer than 12 non-Hispanic Asian renter households for each year. Therefore, we do not present percent-
ages for this population in Washington Heights/Inwood.
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“the “eviction bonus” creates a perverse incentive for 
landlords to push rent-regulated tenants out of affordable 
apartments through poor services, constant construction, 
and evictions that are easy to file but hard to fight”
 
Therefore, we join other housing advocates in recommending that the state strengthens 
rent regulation laws by amending or eliminating the vacancy decontrol rule to prevent rent 
stabilized units from leaving the pool of affordable apartments. Concretely, the loss of units 
each year undermines the city’s efforts to provide affordable apartments to its residents. As 
a recent feature in The New York Times documents27, the “eviction bonus” creates a per-
verse incentive for landlords to push rent-regulated tenants out of affordable apartments 
through poor services, constant construction, and evictions that are easy to file but hard to 
fight. Landlords rely on law firms that churn out tens of thousands of cases per year with 1 
in 10 rentals in the city receiving eviction notices last year. Landlords also exploit a housing 
court system with overburdened judges for whom it is hard to verify claims on eviction no-
tices, and where most tenants do not have legal representation despite a recent NYC law 
that aims to provide free counsel to low-income tenants. The Times uncovered hundreds 
of eviction filings using generic templates for violations that could be as vague or as trivial 
as “smoking and/or drinking and/or gambling and/or loitering.” Lawyers who do not verify 
landlord claims in eviction filings, and process servers who fail to deliver eviction notices to 
tenants in the proper manner face little to no sanctions. Therefore, the “eviction bonus,” 
which allows landlords to deregulate rent stabilized apartments, coupled with inadequate 
housing court protections, has created a system that benefits the real estate industry at the 
expense of tenants. The way we see it, the “eviction bonus” represents an insidious action 
that borders on corruption, providing the opportunity for one group to benefit from another 
in an unethical manner.
“the “eviction bonus” represents an insidious action that 
borders on corruption, providing the opportunity for one 
group to benefit from another in an unethical manner”
 
27 Barker, K., Silver-Greenberg, J., Ashford, G and Cohen, S. The Eviction Machine Churning 
Through New York City. The New York Times. (2018, May 20). Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/nyc-affordable-housing.html
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B. Preferential rent
A different loophole in rent regulation allows landlords to charge preferential rent in 
rent-stabilized apartments. The “preferential rent” provision was introduced in 2003 and 
allows landlords to charge less than the maximum allowable rent under rent stabilization. In 
theory, such discounts on rent should be good for tenants, but in practice the “preferential 
rent” provisions benefit landlords in several ways. Landlords have to register the maximum 
legal rent for their apartments in accordance with rent stabilization rules, but in practice 
they are free to put any figure as the legal rent as New York State’s Division of Housing and 
Community Renewal (DHCR) rarely checks to see if the rent that landlords register with the 
Division is in compliance with rent regulations.28 Therefore, landlords are free to register a 
maximum rent that is higher than what an apartment could realistically be rented for, attract 
a new tenant with a “preferential rent” rider in the lease, and then raise the preferential 
rent up to the maximum allowable amount at any point a tenant renews his/her lease. This 
is possible because preferential rents are not subject to any of the annual caps of rent in-
creases that are decided by the NYC Rent Guidelines Board. This underhanded practice 
can displace tenants who cannot pay for the difference between their preferential rent and 
the maximum allowable rent.29
For landlords, eliminating preferential rents is not only a way to push tenants out, but it 
could also be a deterrent for tenants to complain about apartment disrepair lest they lose 
the preferential rent clause in their lease.30 In gentrifying neighborhoods, preferential rents 
could be used to speed the process of tenant turn-over and to extract additional rent from 
tenants in years when the Rent Guidelines Board decides on a rent freeze or small increases 
in the maximum allowable rents.31 What is particularly concerning is that the city’s Indepen-
dent Budget Office found a 55% increase citywide between 2008 and 2015 in the median 
gap between preferential rents and maximum allowable rents, with the gap in Manhattan 
being over $800.32
28 Podkul, C. (April 25, 2017). New York Landlords Exploit Loophole to Hike Rents Despite Freeze. 
ProPublica. Retreived from https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-landlords-exploit-loophole-to-
hike-rents-despite-freeze
29 Kende, J. (March 23, 2018). State Must Patch Holes in City’s Rent Regulation. Crain’s New York 
Retrieved from http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20180323/OPINION/180329956/op-ed-state-
must-patch-holes-in-citys-rent-regulation
30  Podkul, ProPublica, April 25, 2017.
31 Podkul, C. (June 22, 2017). Many ‘Rent-Stabilized Apartments Are Not Really Stabilized. See 
Where They Are. ProPublica. Retreived from https://www.propublica.org/article/rent-stabilized-nyc-apart-
ments-preferential-rent-mapped-zip-code
32  Podkul, ProPublica, April 25, 2017.
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“In gentrifying neighborhoods, preferential rents could 
be used to speed the process of tenant turn-over and to 
extract additional rent from tenants ”
 
As reflected in Table 2, about 26% of rent stabilized apartments in Washington Heights/In-
wood currently have preferential rent terms. This is somewhat below the citywide average of 
31%, but it still represents a sizeable number of tenants who could be displaced should their 
landlords decide to charge the maximum allowable rent. ZIP codes in Washington Heights/
Inwood (10034 and 10040), where the Dominican population is either close to half or half 
of the total ZIP code population, are also the ones with the highest percentage of stabilized 
units with preferential rents (see Table 2). Therefore, it is a must for the state to reform how 
rent increases are handled in rent-stabilized units with preferential rents. The rent stabiliza-
tion regulations are up for renewal through the state in 2019 making this the right moment 
to reexamine how the current system could be reformed to preserve the affordability of rent 
stabilized units.
“ZIP codes in Washington Heights/Inwood (10034 and 
10040) where the Dominican population is either close 
to half or half of the total ZIP code population are also 
the ones with the highest percent of stabilized units with 
preferential rents”
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Table 2
Racial/Ethnic Compositions, Preferential Rents, Stabilized Units































10031 32% 58% 12% 28% 2% 56,438 2,503 9,940 25%
10032 45% 70% 11% 16% 3% 57,331 2,800 12,595 22%
10033 45% 70% 24% 4% 2% 53,926 2,823 12,578 22%
10034 48% 72% 19% 7% 2% 38,908 3,033 10,425 29%





47% 71% 17% 8% 2% 198,483 14,425 56,388 26%
New York 
City 7% 29% 34% 24% 14% 8,175,133 251,374 806,210 31%
Sources: Population data by ZIP code - U.S. Census Bureau 2010 Census SF 2; Table DP1. Preferential rent data from 
the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) available at https://assets.documentcloud.
org/documents/3872406/DHCR-Data-Memo-June-2017.pdf
a Population data for Washington Heights/Inwood PUMA (3801) - NYC Department of Planning 2010 Census. Avail-
able at https://popfactfinder.planning.nyc.gov/profile/2099/census
b The population data in the table is from 2010 and the preferential rate data is from 2016.
Notes: Race data is for one race alone not in combination. A visualization of preferential rent data by ZIP code for the 
entire New York City area is available at https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/preferential-rents
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